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NEITHER PURSE NOR SwORD: LESSONS EUROPE CAN LEARN FROM
AMERICAN COURTS' STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
Kevin J. Mitchell*
The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from inject-
ing itself into the clash ofpoliticalforces in political settlements.1
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. President George W. Bush's nominations during his second
term to fill Supreme Court vacancies produced substantial debate and com-
mentary among legal scholars, politicians, special interest groups, and even
comedians.2 Amid much tension and increasingly heated discourse, Chief
Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito survived the gruel-
. B.A., Ashland University (2004); J.D., Case Western Reserve School of Law (2007). I
would like to thank Alexander McClean, Rachel Wyatt, and Dean Hiram Chodosh for their
invaluable feedback during the topic development and writing of this Note. Likewise, I am
indebted to my parents for their encouragement, and most importantly, to Kim for standing
by me through all of life's adventures.
1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2 See Molly McDonough, Alito is Well Known: Is that Good or Bad?,
ABAJoURNAL.COM, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/joumal/redesign/n4sct.html (quot-
ing comments made by Duke law professor, Erwin Chemerinsky); Schumer: 'What Kind of
Justice Will John Roberts Be?', CNN.cOM, Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLI
TICS/09/15/roberts.schumer/index.html (asking if Justice Roberts would "use the court to
turn back a near-century of progress and create the majority that justices Scalia and Thomas
could not achieve"); Joyce Jones, Alito Controversy Continues, http://www.blackenterprise.c
om (last visited Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.blackenterprise.comexclusivesekopen.asp?id =
1493&p=0 (noting the Congressional Black Caucus's letter urging all one hundred Senators
not to confirm Justice Alito); Mark Memmott, Ad Says Roberts Tied to Clinic Violence,
USAToDAY.coM, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-08-08-ro
berts-naralad x.htm (referencing criticism in NARAL Pro-Choice America's advertisement
concerning John Roberts' successful argument, made while acting as assistant to the U.S.
Solicitor General, that a civil rights statute should not prevent pro-life groups from picketing
at abortion clinics); Daniel Kurtzman, Harriet Miers Jokes, http://politicalhumor.about.com
/od/harrietmiers/a/harrietmiers.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (quoting Jay Leno on su-
preme Court Justice Harriet Miers' qualifications: "She's never been a judge before, never
served on the bench. This is part of President Bush's strategy of surrounding himself with
people who are also in over their heads").
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ing appointment process, 3 while nominee Harriet Miers bowed out.4 The
possibility that Justice John Paul Stevens could retire, 5 thus opening a third
vacancy during the President's term, and the concomitant shift in the
Court's balance of power,6 has led to preparation for the "mother of all bat-
tles."7
Regardless of her political persuasions, virtually every American
embraces strong feelings regarding what type of person should sit on the
Court, and how he or she should make decisions.8 This concern extends to
the state level, where every judge wields constitutional authority to strike
down democratically enacted statutes. 9 As courts, both at the federal and
state level, increasingly involve themselves in policy questions and polariz-
ing disputes, the people observe with a skeptical eye. 10
3 See Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Senate Panel Endorses Roberts, WASH. POST,
Sep. 23, 2005, at Al; Alito Confirmed to US Top Court, BBCNEwS.coM, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4665 216.stm.
4 Without suggesting that Democrats would have embraced the nomination, it is interest-
ing to note that Miers' biggest opponents were from the President's own party. This further
underscores the volatile nature of these appointments. See Charles Babington & Thomas B.
Edsall, Conservative Republicans Divided over Nominee, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at All
("President Bush's nomination of Harriet Miers for the Supreme Court splintered the Repub-
lican Party's conservative base, with reaction from key senators and groups ranging from
hostility to silence to praise."); Robert H. Bork, Op-Ed., Slouching Towards Miers, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 19, 2005 ("The administration's defense of the nomination is pathetic: Ms. Miers was
a bar association president.., she shares Mr. Bush's judicial philosophy.., and she is, as an
evangelical Christian, deeply religious.").
5 See Robert A. Sedler, The Supreme Court Will Not Overrule Roe v. Wade, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 1207, 1207 n.4 (2006).
6 See Tom Curry, Justice Stevens Is Key to Court's Future, MSNBC.coM, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9408518/print/l/displaymode/1098.
7 Jason Barnes & Jim Meyers, Next Court Pick.- Mother of All Battles, NEWSMAX.COM,
Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/2/l/210351.shtml?s=lh.
8 Indeed, each of the Justices has his or her own opinion on such issues. Compare
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246-47 (2002) (pre-
ferring a constitutional interpretation that "places considerable weight upon consequences-
consequences valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes" and that "disavows a contrary
constitutional approach, a more 'legalistic' approach that places too much weight upon lan-
guage, history, tradition, and precedent alone while understating the importance of conse-
quences" ), with Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849, 862
(1989) (noting that the purpose of constitutional guarantees is "to require the society [rather
that the Court, by implication] to devote to the subject the long and hard consideration re-
quired for a constitutional amendment before those particular values can be cast aside").
9 See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 522 (1962) ("[N]othing in the
concept of our federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by federal
law.").
10 See Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2005, at Al 9 (tracking "activist judges," or those most likely to overturn statutes).
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Why should nine Supreme Court justices-or worse, a narrow ma-
jority of five-possess final authority to strike down any law, when that law
is supported by an overwhelming popular majority? If all courts, federal and
state, have this power, what kind of person has the requisite qualities for
judging? And if judges decide some of the most compelling issues, over
which the nation may be sharply divided, are political beliefs a valid con-
sideration in the selection process? These are some of the most difficult
questions with which every twenty-first century American grapples.
However, the counter-majoritarian problem," from which each of
these questions stems, is not uniquely an American problem. While Ameri-
can judicial review has its own distinguishing features, the gulf that previ-
ously existed between it and the European model narrows rapidly. 2 This is
due to broad constitutional reform across the globe, which has "transferred
an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judi-
ciaries."' 3 Indeed, even the "last bastions" of pure democracy, where the
judicial role traditionally has been most limited, followed this trend by in-
troducing notions of constitutional supremacy.14
As judicial power expands on both sides of the Atlantic, Europeans
and Americans should ask similar questions. Americans do not have a mo-
nopoly in distrusting judges, for Europeans have long dreaded the "govern-
ment of judges."' 5 Therefore, each of these systems needs to reconcile con-
stitutional rights with self-government and majority rule. If courts have final
authority to protect the people's rights and liberties, as enshrined in consti-
tutional documents, each citizen needs to consider what type of person
should be a judge and how to design a system most likely to select these
types of people.
11 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (2nd ed. 1986). "The
root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system ...
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an
elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now; it exercises control, not in [sic] behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it." Id. at
16-17. In discussing judicial review and judicial selection, Bickel's phrase has become
commonplace. See, e.g., Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and
Judges'Political Speech, 58 FLA. L. REv. 53 n.1 (2006).
12 See generally Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review-And
Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2744, 2746 (2003) [hereinafter Europe Rejected
American Review] ("[D]espite obvious organic differences between the American and Euro-
pean systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in how review actually oper-
ates.").
13 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004).
14 Id. at 2.
15 See Michael H. Davis, A Government of Judges: An Historical Re-view, 35 AM. J.
COMP. L. 559, 559 (1987).
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Judges have been compared to umpires, 16 and the analogy fits in
many ways. Regardless of their jurisdiction or level in the hierarchy, judges
usually hear cases involving two opposing parties. Each party argues its
case before the judge, and throughout the process, that judge makes impor-
tant decisions in determining the outcome of cases. The judge must ensure
that neither party breaks the rules, and in the end, should allow the best ar-
gument to win.
With this great power comes a certain amount of distrust. In the ath-
letic context, it might be suspicious if a person referees a game between his
alma mater and its most bitter rival. Perhaps there would be even more sus-
picion if that official had an ongoing relationship with his or her former
school. Even worse, imagine the public outcry were it revealed that the
school pays the referee's salary, thereby providing security for his or her
financial and professional future. 17 When the stakes are even higher, when
life and death and one's livelihood are at stake, it is clear why judges must
be impartial in their administration of justice.
Virtually everyone recognizes that personal corruption of a judge,
such as bribery and extortion, is wrong. As Romania and Bulgaria sought
European Union membership between 2002 and 2007, each faced harsh
criticism regarding instances of corruption in their judiciary.18 In Bulgaria,
for example, citizens considered the judiciary to be not only ineffective, but
also one of the most corrupt branches of the government. 19
Justice should not be for sale, and considering reform efforts around
the world, there is universal agreement on this truth. While personal corrup-
tion is certainly a problem, the appearance of judicial bias--or what could
be called "perceived corruption"--is also a problem. Many legal systems
16 See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729, 738 (1906); see also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:
An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1975) ("Most of us have had occasion to
think of the analogy to the selection of former athletes as umpires for athletic contests. It may
not press the comparison too hard to say it serves as a reminder that the 'sporting theory'
continues to infuse much of the business of our trial courts.").
17 See Gregg Doyel, AD/Referee: Right Calls, Not Bubbles, All That Matter,
CBSSPORTSLINE.COM, Mar. 3, 2005, http://cbs.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/story/82495
32. Rick Hartzell served as both Northern Iowa's Athletic Director and a referee for non-
Missouri Valley Conference [Northern Iowa's conference] games. Because Northern Iowa
was a so-called "bubble" team vying for a position in the NCAA tournament, other "bubble"
teams questioned Hartzell's objectivity as an official. See id.
"8 Dan Bilefsky, Candidates Vow to Fight Corruption, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 26, 2005,
at 3. Though Russia is not actively petitioning for admission to the EU, it too has announced
efforts to comply with international norms in order to combat corruption in the judiciary.
Anatoly Medetsky, Judicial Reform Headed for Duma, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at 3,
available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/10/24/014.html.
19 Dan Bilefsky, Candidates Vow to Fight Corruption, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 26,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/25/news/eu.php.
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view this latter type of corruption as equally dangerous, particularly be-
cause it causes public distrust in the judiciary. Public confidence is vital to a
well-functioning judiciary, so regardless of whether actual bias exists, the
appearance can be sufficient to remove a judge from a particular case.
When litigation centers on controversial public policy issues and
constitutional debates, these concerns are magnified. Over the years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has deliberated and ruled upon many "hot button" is-
sues,21 and many question the Court's ability to remain separate from poli-
tics. 22 In the game of constitutional conflicts, many people believe that if
you can nominate the right judge, you can get the right outcome. Thus,
American judicial selection-whether by appointment or election-has be-
come an exercise of the popular will to determine constitutional questions. 3
The purpose of this Note is to show that increasing stakes in judicial
selection and increasing animosity surrounding judicial review is not unique
to the American system, but is inextricably linked to the notion of a consti-
tutional democracy. Thus, European nations should take note: the American
experience serves as a preview of what is to come. As courts balance major-
ity rule with minority rights, no liberal democracy can avoid the "counter-
maj oritarian problem."
Section II of this Note provides an introduction to the civil law and
common law legal traditions. By noting distinctions on the judiciary's role,
its relationship to the other branches of government, and the methods of
selection, this Section attempts to provide a basic framework through which
20 In the United States, a federal judge whose impartiality might be "reasonably ques-
tioned" should be disqualified. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). Courts have interpreted the
Due Process clause to protect a person's right to an unbiased judge. See 48A C.J.S. Judges §
239 (2005) (citing U.S. v. Scuito, 531 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Conforte, 457 F.
Supp. 641 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980)). Both Germany and Switzer-
land use a comparable approach. For example, Article 58 of the Swiss Constitution states that
"No one may be deprived of his lawful judge," and the German Constitution uses nearly
identical language. See Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Recusal Standards for Judges in Pennsylvania:
Cause for Concern, 36 VILL. L. REv. 713, 762, 767 (1991). Much like the American example,
this approach focuses not only actual impartiality, but also the "impression of impartiality."
See generally id. at 768 (noting that German civil procedure provides for recusal where "a
reasonable appearance of partiality" exists).
21 Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies, ABAJOURNAL.COM, Sept. 29, 2005, http://www.a
banet.org/joumal/redesign/10flnad.html (tracing this dispute back to the Court's 1803 Mar-
bury v. Madison decision, considered "the poster child of the American legal system"). The
Marbury decision is discussed more fully infra at Part 1V.C.
22 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOzO L.
REv. 525, 533-34 (2005) ("[J]udicial nomination is the functional equivalent of a complex
piece of legislation .... In fact, the nomination of a particular candidate can be seen as akin
to proposing legislation.").
23 See id at 526.
2006-20071
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to view historical trends. However, the European constitutional courts'
emergence is cited to show that these traditional distinctions are eroding.
Section III provides an in-depth explanation of how European con-
stitutional courts have emerged in the civil law context. Beginning with
Hans Kelsen's proposals for Austria's Second Republic, this Section traces
the evolution and development of these courts in order to understand their
present-day compositions.
Conversely, Section IV examines the United States constitutional
model, and how judicial review developed and eventually polarized the citi-
zenry. While emerging from the common law tradition, quite distinct from
the civil law tradition, this section also emphasizes commonalities with the
European models.
Lastly, Section V compares the U.S. and European systems, particu-
larly noting how the distinction between these once-distinct systems has all
but eroded. This section addresses the volatile nature of judicial selection
and judicial review in the U.S. and why Europe must address similar issues
in the future. With increasingly similar judicial review mechanisms,
Europe's broader constitutional protections eventually could result in a con-
stitutional crisis.
24
II. CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS
Each culture has a unique legal tradition, and this tradition relates to
societal views about the nature of law, the relationship between law and
politics, and the proper functioning of the judicial system. 25 Though each
culture is unique, many traditions, particularly in Europe and America, fall
within two basic legal systems: civil and common law.26 Without discount-
24 See infra Appendix.
25 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (2nd ed. 1985). Merryman
writes:
A legal tradition, as the term implies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts,
corporations, and crimes, although such rules will almost always be in some sense
a reflection of that tradition. Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically condi-
tioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the
way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal
tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It
puts the legal system into cultural perspective.
Id.
26 See id. at 1. Merryman notes a third strand, the socialist law system. Id. Upon the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, however, this system has become less influential. This Note will
focus primarily on the civil and common law traditions.
658 [Vol. 38:653
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ing contributions made by several other traditions, 27 this Section focuses on
the civil and common law approaches.
A. Two Distinct Legal Systems
The common law tradition traces its origins back to the Normans'
conquering of England in 1066 A.D. In many ways a vestige of British co-
lonialism, the common law system remains the dominant system in the
United States, Canada, England, and Australia.28 Those in the common law
system typically think of the judge as a "culture hero, even something of a
father figure. 29
This system emphasizes the judge's role in shaping policy by rec-
ognizing the doctrine of stare decisis, that similar cases should be decided
similarly. Through robust analysis, the common law judge matches the facts
of a case or controversy with the appropriate, previously decided fact pat-
tern.30 Statutes and legislation, conversely, fulfill an "auxiliary role.",31 Fur-
thermore, and most importantly for the sake of this discussion, those in
common law systems generally are accustomed to the notion of judicial
review, recognizing that a judge may strike down unconstitutional statutes
or governmental actions.32
Conversely, the civil law system remains the most dominant legal
tradition in Western Europe, Central and South America, and many parts of
Asia and Africa.33 Tracing it origins back to 450 B.C. in Rome, the civil law
tradition stands in stark contrast to the common law tradition. One key dis-
tinction between the two is that the civil law judge is considered a career
civil servant or bureaucrat. 34 Most importantly, in the civil law system, leg-
islatures or parliaments draft the laws, and judges simply interpret their
meaning.35
27 See generally id. at 5. Merryman notes the Scandanavian tradition as having evolved
independently of the European traditions. See id Similarly, Islamic law, Hindu law, and a
variety of more localized systems have existed throughout history and continue today. See id.
28 Id. at 4.
29 See id. at 34.
30 See Ralf Rogowski, Introductions, in CIVIL LAW, at xiv (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996);
MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 36.
31 See Rogowski, supra note 30, at xiv.
32 See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 34. But see Rogowski, supra note 30, at 24 (noting
British aversion to American style review).
33 MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 2.
34 Id. at 37 ("The civil law judge is not a culture hero or a father figure, as he often is [in
the common law system]. His image is that of a civil servant who performs important but
essentially uncreative functions.").
35 MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 3
(1996) (referencing the French description of judge as "la bouche de la Ioi," or "the mouth of
2006-2007]
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While judges, including Coke, Mansfield, Marshall, and Cardozo,
are cultural heroes in common law regimes, 36 legislators or politicians like
Justinian or Napoleon are common law icons.37 Judging in the common law
system is often the "crowning achievement" of a successful career.38 Con-
versely, the civil judge's role of interpreting statutory codes shrinks beneath
the more glorious legislative role.3 9
Citizens in common law regimes traditionally revere judges because
of their wisdom in decision-making and persuasive reasoning. The civil law
judge, while respected, does not garner the same level of admiration. In
the law," meaning that he or she has no discretion). This ultimately stems from different
philosophical underpinnings about the nature of law. Common law theorists traditionally
view the law as "an embodiment of principles of reason and conscience implicit in human
nature." Harold J. Berman, Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 13 (2005).
Conversely, civil law theorists tend to be legal positivists in that they view the law as stem-
ming from a political order (see id. at 15)-that is, the law is simply an expression of popular
will. See also Sweet, supra note 8 at 2767 ("In the European positivist's legal order, judges
apply the acts of the lawmaker; in the natural law legal order, judges seek to discover and
then apply principles that exist prior to and independent of any sitting legislature.") (internal
quotations omitted).
36 See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 34.
17 See id. at 36.
38 See id. at 34-35. Merryman writes:
[Common law judges] attend law school and then have successful careers either in
private practice or in government, frequently as district attorneys. They are ap-
pointed or elected to judicial positions on the basis of a variety of factors, including
success in practice, their reputation among their fellow lawyers, and political influ-
ence. Appointment or election to the bench comes as a kind of crowning achieve-
ment relatively late in life. It is a form of recognition that brings respect and pres-
tige. The judge is well paid, and if he is among the higher judicial echelons, he will
have secretaries and research assistants. If he sits on the highest court of a state or
is high in the federal judiciary, his name may be a household word. His opinions
will be discussed in the newspapers and dissected and criticized in the legal peri-
odicals. He is a very important person.
This is what common lawyers mean when they talk about judges.
39 See Sweet, supra note 12, at 2748; see generally MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 35:
[The civil law judge] is a civil servant, a functionary. Although there are important
variations, the general pattern is as follows. A judicial career is one of several pos-
sibilities open to a student graduating from a university law school. Shortly after
graduation, if he wishes to follow a judicial career, he will take a state examination
for aspirants to the judiciary and, if successful, will be appointed as a junior judge.
... Before very long, he will actually be sitting as a judge somewhere low in the
hierarchy of courts. In time, he will rise in the judiciary at a rate dependent on
some combination of demonstrated ability and seniority. He will receive salary in-
creases according to preestablished schedules and will belong to an organization of
judges that has improvement of judicial salaries, working conditions, and tenure as
a principal objective.
[Vol. 38:653
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view of these different roles, each system has devised selection methods
most suitable to meet its particular needs.
B. Judicial Selection in Europe
The Continental system40 in Europe generally utilizes merit-based
selection. The focus is on a potential judge's abilities, as indicated by per-
formance in schooling and on state-administered examinations, 41 rather than
on ideology and political affiliation.42 This again stems from the basic civil
law view that legislatures make the laws, and the judges merely interpret
them. 43 Because important constitutional law questions, discussed below,"
n
are generally separate from the business of courts of general jurisdiction, the
initial selection of judges is not controversial.45
Potential attorneys and judges share in the same university educa-
tion, followed by the first state examination. 46 Those who successfully com-
plete the first state examination, called Referendars, gain work experience
in both civil and criminal law practices, including some government work.47
Next, students undergo a second, more rigorous state examination, after
which they are referred to as Assessors, now eligible for legal practice.48
The completion of the second state examination is typically the
moment of a career decision.49 At this point, the career paths of judges and
40 In this Note, the "Continental system" refers generally to the Western European civil
law countries, particularly Germany and France.
41 Daniel J. Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career Patterns and American-English
Comparisons, 67 JUDICATURE 16, 21 (1983) (noting judicial appointees' particularly high
scores on the second state examination).
42 John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,
853 (1985).
43 VOLCANSEK, supra note 35, at 3 (referencing the French description of a judge as "la
bouche de la lor' (mouth of the law), meaning that he or she has no discretion).
44 See infra Part III.
45 See Langbein, supra note 42, at 853.
46 See Meador, supra note 41, at 20.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. This does not mean that judges never have practical experience, but simply
means this experience would be in some governmental capacity. Meador examines judges'
backgrounds throughout Germany to find some variance in the level of practical experience.
See id. at 24. In Frankfurt, 75% of the appellate judges served on both trial courts, only 6% in
prosecutor's offices, and 0% worked in the ministry of justice. Id. at tbl. 1. In Dusseldorf,
over 75% served on both trial courts, 0% served in prosecutor's offices, and 23% served in
the ministry of justice. Id. In Munich, only 39% served on both trial courts, 6% served in the
ministry of justice, but 100% served in the prosecutor's office. Id. The distinction here is that
a judge's work experience is in the public sector. This can be contrasted with the practice of
common law nations such as the U.S. and England, where the judicial career does not begin
until after lengthy experience in the private sector. See id at 26.
2006-2007]
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private attorneys diverge.50 A young law school graduate faces a variety of
career options, including judge, prosecutor, government attorney, or private
attorney.51 However, after this initial decision, the professional judiciary
52staff controls advancement, so lateral entry to judging is rare.
This selection process assumes that judges rigidly adapt particular
facts to a legislative provision.53 There is never a question of whether a law
is right or wrong; rather, the law simply is. The judge must interpret me-
chanically what the law says, and rule accordingly.
C. American Judicial Selection
In contrast to the Continental system, American judicial selection
has long been a divisive topic54 because nearly every judge, both at the state
and federal level, has the ability to interpret the constitution and create so-
cial change. American judges do not merely say what the law is. Because
every governmental act or legislative enactment must conform to the Con-
stitution, judges have a role in stating what the law should be.
Considering this, the Constitution attempted to provide independent
and accountable judges at the federal level. To ensure independence, the
Constitution bars Congress from cutting judicial salaries for coercive pur-
poses.55 This allows judges to have freedom from political pressures in or-
der to judge cases fairly and impartially. Conversely, accountability is as-
sured by holding judges to a standard of "good behavior. 56 This assures
that judges do not abuse their power by straying too far from their Constitu-
tional authority. In practice, balancing the twin aims of independence and
accountability has proved troublesome.
Throughout its history, America has attempted to solve this difficult
question, and many times, these attempts were political in nature.5 7 During
his presidency, Thomas Jefferson sought to impeach and remove Justice
Samuel Chase.5 8 Prior to the Marbury decision, Congress attempted to sus-
pend the Supreme Court term in 1802.59 Furthermore, attempts were made
50 Langbein, supra note 42, at 849; see MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 101.
51 See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 101; see also id. at 101-07 (discussing in detail the
various alternatives).
52 Id. at 35. Constitutional courts, discussed infra, are an exception to this general rule.
51 See id. at 85.
54 See Langbein, supra note 42, at 853.
55 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
56 See id.
57 See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent and Ac-
countable Judges, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000).
58 PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY 48 (1999).
59 Fein & Neuborne, supra note 57, at 59.
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to manipulate the size of the Court in order to assure a desired result.60 Con-
gress successfully did this during the Civil War, while President Franklin D.
Roosevelt later failed in his attempt.6' Amid the fury that was the Civil
Rights movement in America, many sought to impeach and remove Chief
Justice Earl Warren.62
While many attacked the judges themselves, others focused on judi-
cial selection in hopes of preventing undesirable results in the future. 6 3 Ini-
tially, the colonists preferred a system of judicial appointments, a practice
which can be traced back to the 1701 English Act of Settlement.64 In colo-
nial times, the king appointed colonial judges, 65 whose broad powers ex-
tended outside of the courtroom. 6
6
Although the colonists disdained abuse of judicial power,6 7 the
preference for appointed judges nonetheless was transplanted to America.68
Indeed, after the Revolution, all thirteen colonies, as well as the federal
government, appointed their judges.69 This desire for an independent judici-
ary was rooted in the belief that "the electorate was not capable of evaluat-
ing the professional qualities of judicial candidates.,, 70 Furthermore, there
was a general belief that judges should remain above or outside of the po-
litical fray.7'
60 CARRINGTON, supra note 58, at 48.
61 Id.
62 Fein & Neuborne, supra note 57, at 59.
63 Samuel Latham Grimes, "Without Favor, Denial, or Delay": Will North Carolina Fi-
nally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2266, 2271 (1998).
64 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 196
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) [hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT
THE CROSSROADS].
65 CARRINGTON, supra note 58, at 47.
66 Id. at 48.
67 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10-I1 (U.S. 1776) [hereinafter
DECLARATION].
61 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 197.
69 Grimes, supra note 63, at 2271.
70 Id. at 2272 (citation omitted).
71 See Kyle Cheek, Reconciling Normative and Empirical Approaches to Judicial Selec-
tion Reform: Lessons from a Bellwether State, 68 ALB. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2005) ("By
some [states'] constitutions the members of the [judiciary] are elected, and they are even
subjected to frequent reelections. I venture to predict that these innovations will sooner or
later be attended with fatal consequences; and that it will be found out at some future period,
that the attack which is made upon the judicial power has affected the democratic republic
itself." (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AND ITS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, REVIEWED AND EXAMINED 305 (Henry Reeves trans.,
1867))).
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However, the nineteenth century ushered in a democratic revolution
in judicial selection, influenced heavily by Jacksonian Democracy.72 Just as
Thomas Jefferson had criticized the "runaway, aristocratic, and unaccount-
able" judiciary of his day, so too this new generation favored highly partisan
popular election of judges.73 With more and more focus on party affiliation,
citizens focused on a small number of issues rather than the judicial abilities
or experience of candidates. 74 Beginning with Mississippi in 1832, the "de-
mocratic spirit swept the young nation, 75 and by the next decade, cries for
76popularly elected judges drowned out the status quo.
Still, dissatisfaction remained amongst the citizenry. While selec-
tion by appointment and by popular elections each appealed to factions of
the citizenry, the Missouri Plan gained popularity because it seemed to find
a balance between the extremes. Conceived by Professor Alex Kales and
first adopted in the state for which it is named, the Missouri Plan provides a
useful model for approximately twenty states today.77 Professor Kales' plan
resounded particularly with legal scholars, including the likes of future
president and chief justice of the Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, and
Judge Roscoe Pound.78 The essential elements were as follows: (1) a judi-
cial nominating committee, composed of attorneys, judges, and citizens,
makes a list of possible candidates; (2) an elected official selects one candi-
date from the list to fill a court vacancy; and (3) after a certain period, the
judge stands for a noncompetitive retention election in order to keep her
79position.
While European judicial selection traditionally has been largely un-
controversial, American selection processes have fluctuated in response to
political pressures. The European judge stands above the political fray,
72 See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elec-
tions, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 311-
12 (2003).
73 See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 198.
74 See Grimes, supra note 63, at 2271.
75 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 198 (citation omitted).
76 See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, in
JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 50, 50 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 2005) ("The
debates on an elective judiciary were brief; there was apparently little need to discuss the
abuses of the appointive system, or its failures, or why election would be better .... [T]he
spirit of reform carried the day." (citing Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical
Perspective, THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Nov. 1966,
at 523, 526)).
77 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 199.
78 Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 93 (1998) [hereinafter Carrington, Independ-
ence and Accountability].
79 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 64, at 199.
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while the American judge has long been immersed in it. However, the ad-
vent of European constitutional courts, discussed infra, eroded what was
once a clear institutional distinction. In light of this, European nations must
prepare themselves for similar controversies regarding judicial review and
the judiciary's role in limiting the popular will.
D. Constitutional Courts: Bridging the Gap
Constitutional systems, whether in Europe or the United States, face
an inherent tension between individual rights and majority rule.80 A consti-
tution is simply "a body of rules that specifies how all other legal rules are
to be produced, applied, and interpreted.' It may identify the legislature as
supreme, and thus prevent the judiciary's power from extending over legis-
lative application. Relegating judges to mere interpreters of legislative in-
tent, however, fails to remedy the problem of unjust laws or executive
dominance. Fascism, Nazism, and the horrors of World War II revealed the
fatal flaws of such a system, paving the way for constitutional courts in
Europe.82
Accordingly, rather than granting legislative supremacy, a constitu-
tion may recognize individual rights, and these rights can trump subse-
quently enacted legislation. The latter view predominates both in the United
States and contemporary Europe.83 In each of those systems, the judges who
wield constitutional authority have immense political power.
8 4
This latter view, the "new constitutionalism," has codified human
rights and established constitutional courts in much of Europe.85 When the
80 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 16-17.
81 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 20
(2001) [hereinafter GOVERNING WITH JUDGES].
82 See VOLCANSEK, supra note 35, at 4 (noting that constitutional judges provide a check
on previously unrestrained power); see also GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 37.
Cf U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that the Constitution is the "supreme Law of the Land" in the
United States).
83 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 21 (referencing the trend toward this
latter view in Germany, Italy, and Spain). The U.S. is in some ways unique because, unlike
most European courts, each court in the United States has constitutional authority. See id. at
32.
84 See Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer, Preface, in JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 1, 2 (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer
eds., 2004) (referencing Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that, by virtue of the United
States Constitution, American judges could make decisions based not only on legislation, but
on the Constitution itself).
85 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 31. Examples include Austria (1945),
Italy (1948), Germany (1949), France (1958), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978), Belgium
(1985), and post-communist nations, including Russia and Poland after 1989. See id. The
basic elements of European constitutionalism are that (1) state institutions derive their au-
thority from a written constitution, (2) the constitution gives power to the citizenry through
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government or legislation violates such rights, constitutional courts have
authority to bar the particular action or overturn the law. 6 Consequently,
although Europe and America each comes from its own unique tradition, the
advent of European constitutional courts has eroded this distinction.87
Constitutional courts, whether in Europe or the United States, stem
from the fundamental belief that legislative tyranny, or tyranny of the ma-
jority,88 is of greater concern than judicial despotism. Although the tradi-
tional view of a civil law judge-that he or she is part of a specific class,
trained by a bureaucratic mechanism, 89 constitutional courts, and the judges
who sit on them-does not fit this mold.
Rather than relying on the traditional merit-based approach, in some
European countries the people indirectly select constitutional judges
through legislative selection.90 This generally requires a super-majority of
two-thirds or three-fifths vote, and because single parties rarely possess this
number, selection becomes a highly political bargaining process. In the end,
the constitutional court roughly resembles the parliamentary makeup. 9' Just
as America has grappled with how best to select judges throughout its his-
tory, the advent of constitutional courts has changed the traditional merit-
based selection process in Europe.
1. Fundamental Questions About the Judge's Role
While scholars often write about selection methods, including the
costs and benefits of various approaches, they often neglect the most basic
popular elections, (3) use of legislative or governmental authority is lawful to the extent it
conforms with the constitution, and (4) the law includes individual rights and system by
which those rights are protected. Id. at 37.
86 Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy, 25 W. EUR.
POL. 77 (2002) (hereinafter Constitutional Courts] (defining this power, called constitutional
review, as "authority to evaluate the constitutionality of public acts, including legislation,
and to annul those acts as unlawful when found to be in conflict with the constitutional
law").
87 See C. Neal Tate, Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy: Concepts and Over-
view, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (David W. Jackson and C.
Neal Tate eds., 1992) (noting that "equally dramatic" controversies surrounding judicial
review can be found outside of the U.S.). See also id. at 9 for a description of how Canada's
adoption of a Charter of Rights in 1982, combined with an "activist" judiciary, sparked con-
troversy over judicial review.
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("It is of great importance in a republic.., to
guard one part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily
exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure.").
89 See Langbein, supra note 42, at 848.
90 See Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 88.
91 See id.
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questions about the role of judges. 92 To some extent, this is to be expected.
Recognizing a problem is easier than proposing a fitting solution.
However, discussion about judicial selection reveals a deeper prob-
lem: what is the role of a judge? The civil and common law systems tradi-
tionally answered this question differently. However, at least in regard to
constitutional judges, both Europeans and Americans share increasingly
common views. Judges wielding constitutional authority are not mere bu-
reaucrats, interpreting legislation while remaining detached from overarch-
ing policy questions.
Constructing proper selection systems begins with examination of
the judiciary's ultimate telos,93 Aristotle's term for a thing's most basic pur-
pose.94 One must understand what "justice for all" means, 95 in order to or-
ganize judicial selection processes accordingly. When judges lack those
virtues necessary to fulfill the telos, or ultimate purpose, of the justice sys-
tem, it cannot function properly.96 A legal system directed by the unjust is
doomed to fail. 97
Accordingly, the first question is which virtues are necessary for
judging. 98 By identifying and examining judicial virtues, one may identify
what constitutes a good judge.99 To the extent that particular selection sys-
92 See Marie A. Failinger, Virtuous Judges and Electoral Politics: A Contradiction?, 67
ALB. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004) [hereinafter Virtuous Judges] (noting that most scholarship in
this area focuses on "second-order" questions of how, rather than "first-order" questions of
why it is important).
93 See id. at 771; see also ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 275 (Cares Lord trans., 1984) (edi-
tor's glossary defines telos as "the character of a thing when fully formed, its completion or
perfection").
94 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 3 (Martin Ostwald ed., 1999) ("Every art or applied
science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every action and choice, seem to
aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well defined as that at which all things
aim."); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 93, at 35 (noting that a city is a partnership, and that
every partnership aims toward some good). Lest readers believe this paper focuses solely on
words written almost twenty-four hundred years ago, it should be noted that scholars have
examined Aristotle's theories anew over the past several decades. See Lawrence B. Solum,
The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotlean Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1735, 1735 (1988); Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge be a Good Politician? Judi-
cial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 Mo. L. REV. 433, 433 (2005) [hereinafter
Good Judge] (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d
Ed. 1984) ("Every activity, every inquiry, every practice aims at some good.... [H]uman
beings move by nature towards a specific telos.")).
95 See Virtuous Judges, supra note 92, at 77 1.
96 See Good Judge, supra note 94, at 467.
97 See id. (citing the Biblical parable of the unjust servant who, after having his debt for-
given, refused to do the same for one indebted to him).
98 See Solum, supra note 94, at 1738.
99 See id.
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tems produce particular results, understanding the "first-order" questions
(what is a good judge?) can ultimately determine the answers to "second-
order" questions (how should judges be selected?). If Europeans and
Americans share a common view of what constitutes a good judge on a con-
stitutional court, perhaps they could also share a vision of how best to select
these judges.
According to Aristotle, there exist two types of virtue, intellectual
and moral. 100 One acquires intellectual virtue through scholarship and exer-
cise of reason. 10' Conversely, one acquires moral virtues through habit, or
consistent practice. 0 2 In order to function effectively, judges must possess
certain intellectual and moral virtues.
10 3
To that end, Lawrence B. Solum' °4 delineates three specific vir-
tues. 05 First, a judge must possess a certain judicial intelligence, enabling
him or her to understand and theorize about the law.'0 6 Second, a judge
must also possess practical wisdom in choosing proper legal ends and the
means of achieving these ends. 10 7 Lastly, a judge must possess a sense of
duty, or a special concern for preserving the integrity of the law.
10 8
2. Three Important Judicial Virtues
The adjudication process often hinges on complex legal rules and
their application to a specific set of facts. Many times, legal minds come to
the same conclusion on such cases, and there is little room for dispute.'0 9
However, in particularly difficult cases, educated minds could arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions. A substantial body of knowledge is necessary in such
instances, and judges must be able to make analogies to come to the proper
conclusions.
However, in and of itself, judicial intelligence is insufficient. Even a
brilliant legal mind could make the wrong decision."0 Along with judicial
100 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 94, at 33.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Virtuous Judges, supra note 92, at 771.
104 Lawrence B. Solum is the John E. Cribbet Professor of Law at the University of Illinois
College of Law.
105 Solum, supra note 94, at 1740 (noting a fourth virtue, justice, which means sometimes
following legal rules and other times departing from them).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1742-43.
'"o See id. at 1751 ("[Jludicial intelligence can be used for good or ill. A very intelligent
unprincipled judge could use legal reasoning skills to provide clever but sophistic demonstra-
tions that a personal preference is required by the law; a nihilist judge could use judicial
[Vol. 38:653
NEITHER PURSE NOR SWORD
intelligence, judges also need to possess a more basic, practical wisdom. In
short, a judge must have "common sense.""'
Aristotle distinguished between these two types of wisdom, both of
which are necessary in judging.112 While judges should apply the law, they
must not operate in a vacuum, ignoring the common sense application of
rules and interpretations. Judges historically have been given a certain
amount of discretion because societies realize the near-impossibility of
drafting a legal rule for any and every situation."13 Therefore, practical wis-
dom is necessary.
While theoretical knowledge of the law and a common sense ap-
proach to decision-making are important, judges must possess a sense of
fidelity to the law.' 14 Considering what is at stake in litigation, whether
one's life, one's freedom, or one's property, a judge must recognize his or
her duty to uphold the high standards of the law. This virtue operates inde-
pendently of the judge's personal preferences because, to the extent that
those preferences diverge from the common good, the latter must prevail." 5
In discussing the basic constitutional structures of both Europe and
the United States, it is important to keep these underlying concepts in mind.
The basic structure of a legal system defines the role of a judge. A judge
may merely interpret the law,'16 or a judge may be given more discretion in
policy decisions. In describing the European and American models, it is
important to ask if each agrees on the role of the judge, and if not, how they
differ.
III. EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
As the civil legal tradition has evolved, the role of the judge has
evolved as well. European constitutional courts have drastically altered the
traditional belief in legislative sovereignty. In an era of change, Europeans
must reevaluate judicial virtues in order to devise appropriate selection sys-
tems.
intelligence to create indeterminacy where stability could be found. In part because of these
possibilities, the intellectual virtue of judicial intelligence is necessary but not sufficient ...
.").
.' Seeid. at 1753.
112 Id. at 1753; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 94, at 312-13(distinguishing
in editor's glossary between Aristotle's use of phronesis [practical wisdom] and sophia
[theoretical wisdom]).
113 See Solum, supra note 94, at 1753 (discussing the need for judges to have both theoreti-
cal and practical wisdom).
114 See id. at 1751.
115 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 473d (Allan Bloom trans., 1991).
116 See VOLCANSEK, supra note 35.
117 See generally Constitutional Courts, supra note 86.
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A. Legislative Supremacy in the Civil Law Tradition
Traditionally, the Continental legal tradition granted legislative su-
premacy to the parliament. For example, Germany explicitly banned judicial
review from 1780 onward, and France did the same beginning in 1791.18
Over a century later in 1921, law professor Edouard Lambert published a
book" 9 in which he described an unconstrained system of review. Therein,
Lambert famously coined the phrase "government of judges," which em-
bodies the European contempt for an undemocratic system of judicial re-
view. 1
20
The civil law judge thus remained subservient to the legislative
will; she could stray no further than the rigid interpretation of statutes. 21 It
is therefore not surprising that Europeans opposed judicial review, which
they understood to denote "the involvement of the judiciary in social poli-
cies, in economic policies, and in the quarrels and passions of the electoral
battle.' 22 Europe, as a whole, thus rejected judicial review out of a fear that
activist judges would blur the traditional lines between separate governmen-
tal powers.
23
When considering the three judicial virtues outlined above, the civil
law system traditionally focused on the first. Judging was viewed essentially
an intellectual exercise, and therefore, judicial intelligence was the most
basic necessity. Because judges merely interpreted the law, made no inde-
pendent policy or constitutional judgments, practical wisdom and a special
concern for preserving the integrity of the law were not as important. This
in no way diminishes the civil law system; rather, it serves as a useful start-
ing point in understanding the role of the civil law judge.
' See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 32; id. at 33 (citing French law in 1790,
which stated, "courts could not "interfere with the exercising of legislative powers or sus-
pend the application of the laws").
119 The book's title is Le Gouvernement des Juges et la Lutte Contre la Legislation Sociale
aux Etats-Unis. Davis, supra note 15, at 559.
120 Id.
121 See generally GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 1 (noting the old system of
"[plarliamentary supremacy").
122 Davis, supra note 15, at 564 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
123 See generally id. A court vested with review power would not technically be a "court,"
nor would a judge on that court truly be "judge." See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 38.
Rather, those adhering to the traditional view would consider such a court to be a quasi-
legislative body.
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B. Austria's Second Republic: Implementing Kelsen's Vision
The twentieth century ushered in a new constitutionalism through-
out much of Europe. 124 By elevating constitutions above parliaments and
legislatures, the advent of constitutional courts changed the way Europeans
would view judges.' 25 In order to understand the nature of European consti-
tutional courts, one must look to Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen, who is
considered their "spiritual godfather.'
2 6
Kelsen attempted to reconcile judicial review with European de-
mocracy, while at the same time rejecting the American model.' 2 7 Kelsen
was an influential scholar who drafted Austria's 1920 Constitution, which
established the nation's Second Republic (1920-1934). 12' During this time
period, Austria became the first nation to adopt a Kelsenian constitutional
court, and this model would later provide a model for the rest of Europe.
129
Kelsen faced opposition from two camps, each of whom he had to
persuade. 130 On one hand, politicians were weary of ceding power to the
judiciary; on the other, many prominent legal scholars preferred the Ameri-
can system of review.' 3 ' The Kelsenian court, therefore, can be viewed as a
compromise between two opposing views.
The essential elements of Kelsenian courts are as follows. First,
constitutional courts have exclusive and final jurisdiction to adjudicate con-
stitutional disputes, while the rest of the judiciary remained prohibited from
judicial review.132 Second, unlike their American counterparts, constitu-
tional court judges are appointed by supermajoritarian procedures for fixed,
nonrenewable terms. 3 3 Third, constitutional courts concern themselves with
disputes only if individuals or specifically designated authorities seek re-
124 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 31.
125 See generally id. at 1.
126 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2004).
127 See Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 79.
128 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 34.
129 See id. (citing DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2nd ed. 1997); Klaus von Beyme, The Genesis of Constitu-
tional Review in Parliamentary Systems, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 21 (Christine Landfried ed., 1989)).
130 See Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2766. Kelsen wrote an article
in 1928 where he elaborated on and defended his concept ofjudicial review. Id. (citing Hans
Kelsen, La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 197
(1928)).
131 See Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2766.
132 Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 79-80.
133 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1677-78.
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view. 134 Third, constitutional courts, though linked, are formally detached
from both the judiciary and the legislature. 35 Fourth, constitutional courts
may review legislation or a policy prior to enactment in order to prevent
unconstitutional behavior.'
36
While constitutional courts maintained these distinct features, Kel-
sen also emphasized that they should look like other courts, staffed by pro-
fessional judges and law professors. 137 This suggests an attempt to not dra-
matically transform the nature of judging. While constitutional judges nec-
essarily would differ from other judges, Kelsen's vision did not stray too far
from the civil law tradition.
Ultimately, Kelsen attempted to achieve benefits of judicial review
without devolving into a "government of judges."' 38 Maintaining this dis-
tinction between judges and legislators was fundamental in Kelsen's mind.
He considered parliaments to be "positive legislators" and constitutional
judges to be "negative legislators."' 139 In essence, judicial review would be
limited to striking down unconstitutional statutes, rather than creating or
recognizing rights or duties in the way the legislature could. 4° Constitu-
tional courts thus provided an essential check on legislative supremacy by
enforcing "the ultimate rule of law.'
4 1
Kelsen's distinction between judges and legislators depended al-
most entirely on the absence of an enforceable charter of rights. If a consti-
tution grants broad rights and the court must interpret the constitution, then
the judge takes on a legislative role. 142 This is because broad rights are
vague and susceptible to many interpretations.
43
134 Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 79-80. See also Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra
note 126, at 1677 (noting that most cases come before constitutional courts on paper, rather
than as presented by opposing parties).
135 Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 80.
136 Id.
137 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 36.
138 Id. at 35.
139 id.
140 Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 81 ("Although this fact is ignored by his mod-
em-day followers, Kelsen explicitly warned of the 'dangers' of bestowing constitutional
status to human rights, which he equated with natural law, because a rights jurisprudence
would inevitably lead to the obliteration of the distinction between the 'negative' and the
'positive' legislator.").
141 Davis, supra note 15, at 565.
142 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 35.
143 See generally Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2767 (noting Hans
Kelsen's qualms with constitutional incorporation of human rights, which are "open-ended
[in] nature").
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Thus, invoking natural law concepts of absolute, individual rights
violates the Kelsenian court's basic structure. 44 These concepts also dra-
matically alter the nature of the judicial role. The civil law notion of the
civil servant, merely interpreting legislation, must give way to a more com-
plex judicial process. The second virtue outline above, practical wisdom, is
necessary in determining broad constitutional questions. At the same time,
Kelsen's deliberate attempt to avoid broad, rights-based language severely
limited the important of the sense of duty to the law. In essence, Kelsen
complicated the judicial role, but he was not willing to altogether dismiss
the traditional civil law ideals.
C. Post- World War II Europe: Transforming the Kelsenian Court
Prior to World War II, only Austria had adopted Kelsen's ap-
proach. 45 Although seeds of judicial review were planted in the German
system during the Weimar Republic, 146 Nazism removed any hope of for-
mally establishing judicial review. 147 Although the Nazi example is unique
in its atrocious outcome, the fundamental flaws were common to virtually
all European countries. 48 Constitutions could be revised upon legislative
whim, they lacked any affirmative grants of positive rights, and the judici-
ary could not enforce their provisions. 149
144 See id.; GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 36.
145 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 36.
146 Hitler ascended to power within the structure of the Weimar Republic (1919-1931).
Although the constitution technically remained enforceable until after the beginning of
World War II, in effect the Nazi regime rendered its provisions useless and unenforceable in
court. For a more complete exposition, see generally Robert Gerwarth, The Past in Weimar
History, 15 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 1 (2006); Europe Rejected American Review, supra note
12, at 2765 n.94 ("Germany... had its own turn to natural law, and legal scholars and judges
also intensively debated judicial review. In 1863, a majority of the Association of German
Jurists declared itself in favor of judicial review. . . . During the Weimar Republic, the
Reichtsgericht [Germany's highest court of appeals at the time] nullified the application of
several statutes adopted by the parliament during the 1921-25 period.").
147 See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 140 (2nd ed. 1977).
148 Some have argued that the horrors of Nazi Germany can be attributed to its firm belief
in legislative supremacy. When a legislature can define the law and change it on a whim, all
the while remaining unchecked by an independent judiciary, no institutional obstacle exists
for gross abuses of power. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications
from the Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Sub-
stantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101, 151 (2002) ("A typical post-war Germany critic of
positivism was Judge Weinkauff, whose highly successful career had begun under Hitler, and
who remained a judge after the war. His rendition of positivism as the culprit for Nazi judi-
cial abuses implicitly exculpated his own decisions from the bench, as well as those of his
judicial brethren.").
141 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 8 1, at 3 1.
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However, the fallout from World War II sparked a "rights revolu-
tion" throughout Europe.150 This atmosphere was conducive not only to the
adoption of a Kelsenian court, but in many ways conducive to a constitu-
tional court more expansive than Kelsen's original design.' 5' As Alec Stone
Sweet 52 writes:
The awesome destruction of World War II made possible the diffusion of
the Kelsenian court. The bitter experience of fascism in Italy and Germany
before the war, and the massive American presence in both countries after
it, conspired to undermine fatally deeply entrenched ideologies that em-
phasized the state's omnipotent nature. Taming the state ... was suddenly
at the very top of the European agenda. As democratic reconstruction pro-
ceeded, higher law constitutionalism became the new orthodoxy.1
53
Thus, World War II served to "fatally undermine the view that parliaments
could do no wrong."' 54 Many consider the distinction between a pure de-
mocracy, where the majority always triumphs, and a constitutional democ-
racy, where minority rights expressly limits majority rule, to be the twenti-
eth century's crowning achievement.
55
Consequently, the notion of a judge as a mere civil servant, acting
in accord with legislative commands, had all but eroded. 56 When states like
Austria, Italy, Germany, and Spain created rigid constitutions in the mid-
twentieth century, judicial review gained prominence: the judges, not the
legislatures, would ultimately guard individual rights. 157 This resulted in a
transfer of both power and prestige to constitutional court judges.5 8 This
completed the transformation of the civil law judge, once defined by judi-
cial intelligence alone, to a constitutional judge, possessing all three virtues,
equally important in constitutional adjudication.
"s0 See id. at 38.
'5' See id.; see also Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1671 (noting that Western
European nations "embraced notions of individual rights and limited government").
152 Leitner Professor of Law, Politics, and International Studies, Yale Law School.
151 GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 37. See also Tate, supra note 87, at 8 (argu-
ing that judicial review is closely aligned with democratic government, as evidenced by
Japan's post-World War II creation of a constitutional court).
154 Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2769.
155 See HIRSCHL, supra note 13, at 2-3.
156 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1675 (noting this trend in post-
authoritarian regimes, including post-World War II Europe, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s,
and former Soviet countries).
117 See id. at 1676.
158 See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 157.
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D. Contemporary Europe's Constitutional Courts
Despite the post-World War II expansion of positive rights, Euro-
pean constitutional courts still follow Kelsen's basic model. 15 9 These courts
are separate from ordinary courts, and they exercise exclusive and final ju-
risdiction on constitutional matters. Rather than settling disputes between
parties, they solve only constitutional questions. Constitutional courts do
have some linkage to both the judiciary and the legislature, but there is no
formal attachment. Thus, they are, strictly speaking, entirely separate enti-
ties. Lastly, these courts can review statutes before their passage, which
enables courts to become legislative advisors.
Thus, the European model essentially functions as follows. First,
the judiciary-that is, the ordinary courts-ensures legislative supremacy
by enforcing statutes. 160 Second, the constitutional court operates wholly
separate from this process, ensuring that the constitution reigns supreme
over all government actions. 16 1 This distinction has helped Europe, as a
general rule, to avoid the "politicization of judging that is characteristic of
American courts."'
162
One of the most key features maintained from the Kelsenian model
is the exercise of abstract review. American judicial review typically is con-
crete, which means it addresses a particular case or controversy between
two opposing parties. 163 Thus, it is fundamentally a posteriori, or backwards
looking.164 Conversely, European constitutional courts 165 are able to review
a statute or policy prior to implementation, and this could be described as a
priori review. 166 In sum, abstract review allows "preenforcement constitu-
tional review" of legislative acts. 1
67
159 GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 33-34 (listing the basic elements of "the
European model of constitutional review").
160 Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2770.
161 See id.
162 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1672 (internal quotations omitted) (citing John
Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 43,
(2002)).
163 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (discussing the constitutional standing re-
quirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision). Likewise, a court may
not hear a case before a controversy exists between actual parties, see United Public Workers
of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947), or when a controversy no longer exists, see
Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
164 See Tate, supra note 87, at 6.
165 The German Constitutional Court does stray from this general rule. It exercises both
abstract and concrete review. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 147, at 140.
166 See Tate, supra note 87, at 6.
167 Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2770-71.
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Therefore, it is important to consider the European courts as a deli-
cate balance between Kelsen's vision and the new constitutionalism. Consti-
tutional courts are able to enforce positive rights and as a result, can exer-
cise essentially legislative functions.168 Thus, the old vision of courts that
merely interpret the law is a remnant of a pre-World War II world. While
Kelsen's basic model remains in place, 169 constitutional courts in Europe
share much in common with their American counterpart.
70
IV. THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
While European constitutional courts are only decades old, the
American legal tradition has recognized the importance of judicial review
for over two hundred years.' 71 Contrasted with the traditional civil law
model, the American judge has long been admired, her just decrees even
compared to those of God. 172 In light of this high view, the ideal American
judge is one who possesses all three of the virtues outline above. She must
not only be intelligent, but she must also exhibit practical wisdom and a
sense of duty to the law.
A. The Declaration as Historical Context
In order to understand American constitutionalism, one must look
to the American Founding. Technically speaking, the American Founding
was not a particular moment, but a process, a series of events. However, the
Declaration of Independence stands out as a seminal moment in American
history, and it provides the context through which the U.S. Constitution may
be understood. 173 The Declaration's language records the revolutionary
views that provide the metaphysical basis for the Framers' plan for govern-
ment.
At the heart of the Declaration lie four basic truths, or as Thomas
Jefferson refers to them, "self-evident" truths. 174 First, human beings are
168 See Tate, supra note 87, at 9.
169 See Sweet, Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2769.
170 See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at I ("European policy-making has been
judicialized.").
171 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
172 See Carrington, Independence and Accountability, supra note 78, at 93 (citing President
and Chief Justice Taft's 1911 speech in New York).
173 See also Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, 1774, in
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 273, 287-88 (Adrienne Koch and
William Peden eds., 1993) ("[T]hese are our grievances, which we have thus laid before his
Majesty, with that freedom of language and sentiment which becomes a free people claiming
their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their Chief Magistrate."
(emphasis added)).
174 See DECLARATION, supra note 67, at para. 2.
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created equal. Although there are surely distinctions, the most basic nature
of humanity dictates that each is equal to another. Second, the Creator has
endowed each human being with certain "unalienable Rights", including
life, liberty, and what Jefferson calls "the Pursuit of Happiness.' ' 75 Third,
the purpose of government is to secure these rights. Indeed, governmental
power and legitimacy is derived from the "consent of the governed," rather
than status, class, or lineage. Fourth, when government fails in its essential
mission-that is, securing rights-the people have a right to create a new
government that is more apt to fulfill that mission.1
76
B. Drafting a Constitution
Immediately following the American Revolution, the original thir-
teen colonies 177 entered into a "league of friendship."'' 78 Organized around a
relatively weak national government, the Articles of Confederation allowed
the States to retain a substantial amount of sovereignty. Eventually, the Ar-
ticles' futility led to drastic revisions.
The Framers of the United States Constitution met in Philadelphia
in the year 1787. The goal remained the same as that set forth in the Decla-
ration: to institute a government most likely to secure the people's safety
and happiness. Two opposing camps dominated the convention: the Feder-
alists and the Anti-Federalists. 79 In the end, the Federalists succeeded in
strengthening the national government.18
0
Responding to an increasingly powerful national government, the
Anti-Federalists' chief contribution was the Bill of Rights. 1 ' By 1781, the
first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution were ratified, and several
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 Technically speaking, Canada was granted the right to join under the Articles of Con-
federation, though it never elected to do so. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (U.S.
1781).
178 Id. at art. III.
179 See Murray Dry, Introduction, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 1 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1985)
180 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to, among other things, lay and
collect taxes, coin money, promote progress in the sciences, and regulate commerce); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1-2 (vesting executive power in the President, who serves as Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces and can make treaties with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate).
181 See Murray Dry, Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention,
in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 179, at 239 ("[F]or it is also a maxim, that the legisla-
ture has a right to alter the common law. Such a power forms an essential part of legislation.
Here, then a declaration of rights is of inestimable value. It contains those principles which
the government never can invade without an open violation of the compact between them
and the citizens.").
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rights, including freedom of speech, religion, and press, among others. 182
Because the government could not infringe upon these rights, the American
Founding stands apart from the civil law tradition of legislative supremacy.
Institutionally, the Constitution established three distinct branches
of government: the legislative (Congress), the executive (the President), and
the judiciary (the Supreme Court). Implicitly rooted in the separation of
powers doctrine, the Constitution lays out three distinct and co-equal
branches of government for the American system. 8 3 Similarly, the Consti-
tution divides authority between the federal and state government, which
provides another layer of security for the people's rights.
8 4
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, Arti-
cle VI declares that the "Constitution .. . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."' 8 5 If this is true, the inevitable question is presented: who, then, in-
terprets the Constitution? On one level, the answer is quite simple: the Con-
stitution provides that each branch of government interprets the Constitu-
tion.18 6 However, when two branches disagree in their interpretations, there
must be a final arbiter.
Technically, the Supreme Court had operated under the assumption
that it had final authority to interpret the Constitution,8 7 but it had never
actually struck down a federal statute prior to 1803.188 The traditional view
is that John Marshall created the doctrine of judicial reviewl189 in perhaps the
most famous case in American constitutional law, Marbury v Madison.190
182 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
183 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("[Elach department should have a
will of its own .... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.").
184 See U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
185 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
186 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987) ("[A]s
the three branches of government are coordinate and equally bound to support the Constitu-
tion, 'each must in the exercise of its functions be guided by the text of the Constitution
according to its own interpretation of it."' (quoting EDwARD BURNS, JAMES MADISON,
PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 159 (1938))).
187 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 83 (5th ed. 2005) (citing cases
preceding Marbury).
188 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803).
189 Tate, supra note 87, at 4 (noting that the nineteenth century United States Supreme
Court should receive credit for the modem practice of declaring laws and government actions
to be unconstitutional).
190 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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C. Imposing Limits Through Judicial Review: Marbury v. Madison
In a three-man race for the presidency in 1800, incumbent John Ad-
ams, a Federalist, was the clear loser.191 Prior to leaving office, Adams
made several last-minute appointments, some of which remained undeliv-
ered when he left office. 92 When President Jefferson, a Republican, took
office, his administration refused to deliver any of the remaining commis-
sions, including William Marbury's commission for a justice of the peace
position. 193 However, believing that he had a right to the position, William
Marbury, in concert with his Federalist allies, filed a writ of mandamus
compelling Jefferson's secretary of state, James Madison, to deliver the
commission.' 94
John Marshall, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, would hear
the claim. Much could be written, and indeed has been written,' 95 about this
case, but most significant is Marshall's language on the relation between the
Constitution and legislation.
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives, there is no middle ground. The constitution is
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is
on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alter-
native be true, then the legislative act contrary to the constitution is not
law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd at-
tempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimit-
able. 196
Justice Marshall later writes that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.' 97 And when a law con-
flicts with the Constitution, the Court must strike down such legislation.
98
191 David Forte, The True Story of Marbury v. Madison, Nov. 24, 2003, http://www.clarem
ont.org/publications/crb/id. 1183/article detail.asp.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 82 (1989).
195 See generally id.; WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON (2000); Matthew J. Franck,
Union, Constitutionalism, and the Judicial Defense of Rights: John Marshall, in HISTORY OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 248 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2003).
196 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
197 Id.
198 See id at 178.
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D. Consequences of Judicial Review
Marbury was controversial in 1803, and it continues to be contro-
versial today. Because the U.S. Constitution is the "supreme Law of the
Land"' 99 and because courts determine what laws actually say, the will of
the people, as manifested through legislation, may be deemed unconstitu-
tional. Perhaps even more alarming, "any judge of any court, in any case, at
any time" may declare a law unconstitutional. °° Unlike the European
model, where only one court may exercise constitutional jurisdiction, the
United States implements an "all courts model," which means that any court
may exercise constitutional authority to strike down a statute.20 '
Judicial review, at its core, is undemocratic.20 2 It might support in-
dividual rights and constitutional government, but it is fundamentally un-
democratic because the will of a few may override the will of many.20 3 Be-
cause judicial review gives judges substantial power to override the peo-
ple's will,204 the people naturally care who fills judicial vacancies. This
concern results in a politicized judicial selection process, regardless of how
judges are selected.
The federal selection process has become increasingly divisive over
the years. Special interests have become increasingly involved, and candi-
dates are often supported or opposed based solely on results of decisions,
rather than judicial capability or the legal reason that informs the deci-
205
sions. Nomination of Supreme Court justices epitomizes this partisan
199 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
200 GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 32 (citation omitted). This is not to suggest
that courts use this power recklessly. Judicial doctrines such as act of state or political ques-
tion are designed to avoid these disputes when possible. See id.; see also supra note 163
(citing cases involving the doctrines of Article III standing, ripeness, and mootness).
201 See Tate, supra note 87, at 7.
202 This, of course, does not necessarily undermine the validity of judicial review. As dis-
cussed in Curran, supra note 148, legislative supremacy, based solely on majority rule, poses
a grave threat to the rights of the minority. Nonetheless, judicial review runs contrary to
purely democratic values.
203 The common law tradition can be thought of as similar to a pyramid, with the Supreme
Court sitting on top. The general rule is that every case or controversy is subject to the Su-
preme Court's final authority, which means a popularly-enacted law might be invalidated by
the will of nine, or as few as five, justices. See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 85.
204 Judicial review has important implications on the legislative process. Sometimes deci-
sions are made with judges looking over the legislators' shoulders, while they know the
judge could overturn it. See Tate, supra note 87, at 3.
205 See generally Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 J. INT'L
CONST. L. 652, 655-57 (2006) (describing a nominee's ideology as an "important basis for
appointment"). For a specific example, see Jason Eric Sharp, Constitutional Law-
Separation of Powers-Restoring the Constitutional Formula to the Federal Judicial Ap-
pointment Process: Taking the Vice out of "Advice and Consent," 26 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK
L. REV. 747, 747-49 (2004) (detailing the confirmation process for Judge Leon Holmes).
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tension, as President Bush's nominations of John Roberts, Harriet Miers,
and Samuel Alito indicate.2 °6
State level selection processes are equally divisive.0 7 Although vir-
tually every state has its own unique method or combination of methods for
selecting judges, almost all of them are hotly debated. In the laboratories of
democracy 208 throughout the U.S., no state has found the solution for the
problem.
While politicians battle fiercely over federal appointments, particu-
larly to the Supreme Court, state courts conduct ninety-eight percent of the
nation's legal business and face increasingly politicized election proc-
esses. 20 9 Empirical evidence documents the rising stakes. In 1995-1996, the
average state supreme court candidate spent $260,000; in 1997-1998, the
average candidate spent $340,000; and in 1999-2000, the average candidate
spent $431,000.210
With each dollar spent on judicial campaigns, the distinction be-
tween politician and judge is becoming less and less visible. Indeed, the
majority of Americans distrust the popular election of judges, but at the
same time, they prefer to maintain the status quo.21'
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The reality facing both Europeans and Americans is that Constitu-
tional Judges have an increasing role in making policy decisions. Each legal
system recognizes broad, fundamental rights, and the judiciary is charged
with developing these notions of justice. The civil law notion of the bureau-
cratic judge no longer prevails, at least on constitutional courts, so both the
European and American systems share a vision of the judicial role: one who
possesses judicial intelligence, practical wisdom, and a sense of duty to-
206 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
207 See A.B.A., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON THE 21 ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, at i (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY],
available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf ("[T]he escalating parti-
sanship and corrosive effects of excessive money in judicial campaigns, coupled with
changes in society at large and the courts themselves, have served to create an environment
that places our system of justice, administered by independent and impartial judges, at
risk.").
208 See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (noting the
States' prerogative to "try novel social and economic experiments").
209 See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 207, at xiii.
210 Id. at 22.
211 See Good Judge, supra note 94, at 442; see also Dimino, supra note 72 (arguing that
voter participation in judicial elections is a social good because it "promotes popular sover-
eignty").
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wards the law. The similarities between the two systems enable comparative
analysis that would not have been worthwhile several decades ago.21 2
A. Expanding Definitions of Rights
The substantive chasm that previously divided European and
American constitutionalism is quickly narrowing. European nations have
constitutionalized not only traditional, liberal rights, such as freedom of
speech, equality under the law, and due process, but also more expansive
rights to employment, education, and leisure.21 3 Therefore, the new constitu-
tionalism in Europe seeks not only to guarantee basic rights, but to expand
upon them as well.21 4
Consequently, just as Americans on both sides of the partisan aisle
criticize "activist" judges,21 5 European constitutional courts have become
64 ,216super-legislators." Clearly, Europe has not experienced the constitu-
tional conflicts that America has.217 However, when one considers the broad
218set of rights protected in European constitutions, this stability will be
short-lived. Because the constitutional courts are charged with protecting
these rights and because of the unavoidable "interplay of law and poli-
tics, 219 Europeans can no longer rely on the civil law notion that judges
merely apply legislation enacted by the parliament.
Thus, in both Europe and the United States, the courts' legitimacy
rests in giving persuasive legal justifications for their holdings. 220 As the
traditional separation of powers doctrine in both systems continues to
blur,221 constitutional courts must prove that they are worthy of the power
bestowed upon them.
212 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1681 ("On the substantive level there is
every reason to emphasize similarities rather than differences, but the institutional chasm
remains.").
213 Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 84.
214 MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 156-57.
215 Gewirtz & Golder, supra note 10.
216 See Constitutional Courts, supra note 86, at 82.
217 William E. Forbath & Lawrence Sager, Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law:
An Introduction, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2004) ("European judges engage in almost no
public conflicts; they have no ideologically marked public identities (no Justice Scalias or
Justice Brennans); and no European politicians run for office promising to appoint certain
kinds ofjudges to the constitutional bench.").
218 See generally infra Appendix.
219 See Tate, supra note 87, at 3 (quoting H.W. EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES
(1976)).
220 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1680-81.
221 See Europe Rejected American Review, supra note 12, at 2771-72.
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B. Judges as Policymakers
America has grappled with judicial selection and the concept of ju-
dicial review for over two hundred years. By recognizing unprecedented
individual rights, America sparked a fundamental "intellectual revolution"
in regards to long-established notions of citizen-state relations, 222 and has
valuable experience as a result. As judicial review becomes more prominent
in European constitutional law, those systems should draw from the Ameri-
can experience.
The role of government is to secure the rights of the people.223 And
the role of the courts is to ensure that the government does not infringe upon
those rights, as recognized in the Constitution. Considering this broad
power, some suggest that a judicial nominee's ideology should take center
stage in the selection process.224 As America continues to answer these
questions, Europe needs to keep watch, for they undoubtedly will face simi-
lar problems in the future.
As the civil law tradition enters a "new and dynamic stage of its de-
velopment, ' 2 5 it must recognize the similarities, rather than the differences,
with the common law tradition. History has shown that democratic societies
place their faith in judicial review, believing it to be a "bulwark against au-
thoritarianism., 226 Consequently, Europeans may no longer view judges as
mere civil servants. Instead, they must recognize constitutional judges as
important players in public policy debates. They should be prepared for
increasingly volatile judicial selection processes, similar to those experi-
enced in the United States.227
C. The Difficulty in Selection
Thus far, Europe has avoided many of the difficulties America faces
in judicial selection. While implementing constitutional courts over the last
several decades, political pressures have not forced European countries to
222 See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 14-15.
223 See DECLARATION, supra note 67, at para. 2.
224 See Marshall, supra note 22, at 534 (citing Charles E. Schumer, Judging by Ideology,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A19).
225 MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 158.
226 See Tate, supra note 87, at 8 (noting the 1987 Phillipine constitution's "expansive
grant[] ofjudicial review authority").
227 See Marshall, supra note 22, at 533-34. Although this Note does not address the Euro-
pean Union specifically, the EU could face interesting developments. By implementing a
supranational constitution between many sovereign nations, these same issues could arise on
a much larger scale. See GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 81, at 1; see also Michel
Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S.
Supreme Court, 4 INT'L. J. CONST. L. 618 (2006).
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grapple with the basic problems of selection. However, in light of increasing
similarities between the two systems, this tranquility will not continue in-
definitely.
No serious rival to the new constitutionalism exists in Europe to-
day.228 By focusing on abstract, rather than concrete, review, constitutional
courts have an even more active role in the legislative process than their
American counterpart. 229 Therefore, Europe's ability to avoid extremely
politicized selection processes and heated debate surrounding judicial re-
view is not necessarily based on the courts' avoiding public policy disputes.
One could argue that Europe's success in this area stems from an
entirely different approach to judicial selection. U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices, and indeed all federal judges, sit during a term of "good behavior,"
which almost always ensures life tenure. Conversely, the European nations
appoint constitutional judges for fixed, nonrenewable terms. 230 Many na-
tions also use supermajoritarian appointment procedures,231 which is more
likely to satisfy the consensus.232
However, American history shows that neither popular elections,
nor appointments, nor a compromise between the two provide an absolute
answer. Longer terms provide more independence, but less accountability.
Popular elections provide more accountability, but less independence. At-
tempting to find a middle ground, while solving some of these problems,
does not solve them all. Indeed, the fact that the United States, throughout
its history has tried many different variations shows that no single formula
solves the problem.
233
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional distinction between civil and common law systems
continues to erode, and Europe should not turn a blind eye to what could be
a preview of future disputes in their systems. Constitutional democracies are
established upon rights, and the courts must protect those rights from gov-
ernmental actions or legislation. For better or for worse, judges are thrust
into the realm of policy determinations because of this.
The twentieth century taught the world that democracies without
limits are as dangerous as a world without democracies. Where majority
will remains unchecked, the results can be-and indeed have been-
228 SWEET, supra note 81, at 37.
229 See Tate, supra note 87, at 5.
230 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 126, at 1677.
231 See id. at 1678.
232 Forbath & Sager, supra note 217, at 1654.
233 See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
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disastrous. By implementing constitutional courts, legal systems have a
powerful tool against these dangers.
Yet these courts do not come without controversy. Constitutional
judges have substantial authority to make important policy determinations,
and people desire judges who live up to that calling. These judges must be
exceedingly intelligent, practically wise, and unflinchingly devoted to the
law.
The American experience has shown that no perfect system exists.
Neither popular election nor appointments nor a compromise between the
two satisfy the entire citizenry. However, the focus must be on construing
selection systems in such a way as to achieve the judiciary's basic functions.
To that end, Europe must evaluate its current methods in light of the Ameri-
can experience.
APPENDIX
Rights and Responsibilities in European Constitutions
[This chart is adapted from Table 2.1 in ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES 42
(2001). "X" denotes that the right, freedom, or duty is expressly provided for in one or more
constitutional provisions. "Y" denotes that the right, freedom, or duty exists as a result of a
constitutional court's decision, Where neither X nor Y appear, that country's constitutional
law does not provide for the corresponding right, freedom or duty.]
Individual Right/Freedom France Germany Italy Spain
Human Dignity X
Security X X X
Privacy Y X X X
Personal Honor X X
Freely Develop One's Personality X X X
Adequate Health Care X X
Private Property X X X X
Inheritance X X X
Private Enterprise Y X X X
Work X X X X
Choose Occupation X X X
Adequate Pay X X
Adequate Housing X X
Equal Pay for Men/Women X
Form/Join Unions X X X X
Workers Participate in Management X X
Strike X X X X
Unemployment Compensation X X X
Pensions X X X
Vocational Training X X
Leisure/Vacations X X X
Rehabilitation While Incarcerated X X
Social Security Benefits While Incarcerated X
Death Penalty Constitutionally Abolished X X X
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Duties of the States France Germany Italy Spain
Guarantee of Media Pluralism X Y Y X
Protect Family and Children X X X X
Facilitate Social/Economic Progress X X
Regulate Property Rights in Public Good X
Provide Equitable Distribution of Resources X
Provide Public Health Care X X X
Pursue Full Employment X
Provide Unemployment Compensation X X X
Guarantee Safe Working Conditions X X
Guarantee Leisure/Vacation Time X X X
Protect the Environment X X
Protect Linguistic Minorities X
Nationalize Industries X
